Paper A v3.18: remove accountant-level + replication-dominated calibration + Gemini 2.5 Pro review minor fixes

Major changes (per partner red-pen + user decision):
- Delete entire accountant-level analysis (III.J, IV.E, Tables VI/VII/VIII,
  Fig 4) -- cross-year pooling assumption unjustified, removes the implicit
  "habitually stamps = always stamps" reading.
- Renumber sections III.J/K/L (was K/L/M) and IV.E/F/G/H/I (was F/G/H/I/J).
- Title: "Three-Method Convergent Thresholding" -> "Replication-Dominated
  Calibration" (the three diagnostics do NOT converge at signature level).
- Operational cosine cut anchored on whole-sample Firm A P7.5 (cos > 0.95).
- Three statistical diagnostics (Hartigan/Beta/BD-McCrary) reframed as
  descriptive characterisation, not threshold estimators.
- Firm A replication-dominated framing: 3 evidence strands -> 2.
- Discussion limitation list: drop accountant-level cross-year pooling and
  BD/McCrary diagnostic; add auditor-year longitudinal tracking as future work.
- Tone-shift: "we do not claim / do not derive" -> "we find / motivates".

Reference verification (independent web-search audit of all 41 refs):
- Fix [5] author hallucination: Hadjadj et al. -> Kao & Wen (real authors of
  Appl. Sci. 10:11:3716; report at paper/reference_verification_v3.md).
- Polish [16] [21] [22] [25] (year/volume/page-range/model-name).

Gemini 2.5 Pro peer review (Minor Revision verdict, A-F all positive):
- Neutralize script-path references in tables/appendix -> "supplementary
  materials".
- Move conflict-of-interest declaration from III-L to new Declarations
  section before References (paper_a_declarations_v3.md).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

paper/paper_a_abstract_v3.md

@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
 
 <!-- IEEE Access target: <= 250 words, single paragraph -->
 
-Regulations require Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) to attest to each audit report by affixing a signature. Digitization makes reusing a stored signature image across reports trivial---through administrative stamping or firm-level electronic signing---potentially undermining individualized attestation. Unlike forgery, *non-hand-signed* reproduction reuses the legitimate signer's own stored image, making it visually invisible to report users and infeasible to audit at scale manually. We present a pipeline integrating a Vision-Language Model for signature-page identification, YOLOv11 for signature detection, and ResNet-50 for feature extraction, followed by dual-descriptor verification combining cosine similarity and difference hashing. For threshold determination we apply two estimators---kernel-density antimode with a Hartigan unimodality test and an EM-fitted Beta mixture with a logit-Gaussian robustness check---plus a Burgstahler-Dichev/McCrary density-smoothness diagnostic, at the signature and accountant levels. Applied to 90,282 audit reports filed in Taiwan over 2013-2023 (182,328 signatures from 758 CPAs), the methods reveal a level asymmetry: signature-level similarity is a continuous quality spectrum that no two-component mixture separates, while accountant-level aggregates cluster into three smoothly-mixed groups with the antimode and two mixture estimators converging within $\sim$0.006 at cosine $\approx 0.975$. A major Big-4 firm is used as a *replication-dominated* (not pure) calibration anchor, with byte-level pixel-identity evidence (145 signatures across 50 partners) and accountant-level mixture evidence supporting majority non-hand-signing alongside residual within-firm heterogeneity; capture rates on both 70/30 calibration and held-out folds are reported with Wilson 95% intervals to make fold-level variance visible. Validation against 310 byte-identical positives and a $\sim$50,000-pair inter-CPA negative anchor yields FAR $\leq$ 0.001 at all accountant-level thresholds.
+Regulations require Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) to attest to each audit report by affixing a signature, but digitization makes reusing a stored signature image across reports---through administrative stamping or firm-level electronic signing---technically trivial and visually invisible to report users, undermining individualized attestation. We build an end-to-end pipeline that detects such *non-hand-signed* signatures at scale: a Vision-Language Model identifies signature pages, a YOLOv11 detector localizes signature regions, ResNet-50 supplies deep features, and a dual-descriptor verification layer combines deep-feature cosine similarity with perceptual hashing (difference hash, dHash) to separate *style consistency* (high cosine, divergent dHash) from *image reproduction* (high cosine, low dHash). The operational classifier outputs a five-way verdict per signature with a worst-case document-level aggregation; the cosine cut is anchored on a transparent whole-sample Firm A P7.5 percentile (cos $> 0.95$), and the dHash cuts on the same reference. Applied to 90,282 audit reports filed in Taiwan over 2013-2023 (182,328 signatures from 758 CPAs), the operational dual rule cos $> 0.95$ AND $\text{dHash}_\text{indep} \leq 8$ captures 89.95\% of Firm A and yields FAR $\leq$ 0.001 against a $\sim$50,000-pair inter-CPA negative anchor; intra-report agreement is 89.9\% at Firm A versus 62-67\% at the other Big-4 firms (a 23-28 percentage-point cross-firm gap). Validation uses three annotation-free anchors (310 byte-identical positives, $\sim$50,000 inter-CPA negatives, and a 70/30 held-out Firm A fold) reported with Wilson 95\% intervals. Three statistical diagnostics applied to the per-signature similarity distribution (Hartigan dip test, EM-fitted Beta mixture with logit-Gaussian robustness check, Burgstahler-Dichev / McCrary density-smoothness procedure) jointly characterise the distribution as a continuous quality spectrum, which motivates the percentile-based anchor and is itself a substantive finding for similarity-threshold selection in document forensics.
 
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