# Abstract Regulations require Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) to attest to each audit report by affixing a signature. Digitization makes reusing a stored signature image across reports trivial---whether by administrative stamping or firm-level electronic signing---potentially undermining individualized attestation. Unlike signature forgery, *non-hand-signed* reproduction reuses the legitimate signer's own stored image, making it visually invisible to report users and infeasible to audit at scale manually. We present an end-to-end pipeline integrating a Vision-Language Model for signature-page identification, YOLOv11 for signature detection, and ResNet-50 for feature extraction, followed by a dual-descriptor verification combining cosine similarity and difference hashing. For threshold determination we apply three methodologically distinct estimators---kernel-density antimode with a Hartigan unimodality test, Burgstahler-Dichev/McCrary discontinuity, and EM-fitted Beta mixtures with a logit-Gaussian robustness check---at both the signature and accountant levels. Applied to 90,282 audit reports filed in Taiwan over 2013-2023 (182,328 signatures from 758 CPAs), the methods reveal a level asymmetry: signature-level similarity is a continuous quality spectrum that no two-component mixture separates, while accountant-level aggregates cluster into three groups with the antimode and two mixture estimators converging within $\sim$0.006 at cosine $\approx 0.975$. A major Big-4 firm is used as a *replication-dominated* (not pure) calibration anchor, with visual inspection and accountant-level mixture evidence supporting majority non-hand-signing and a minority of hand-signers; we report capture rates on both 70/30 calibration and held-out folds with Wilson 95% intervals to make fold-level variance visible. Validation against 310 byte-identical positives and a $\sim$50,000-pair inter-CPA negative anchor yields FAR $\leq$ 0.001 at all accountant-level thresholds.