# V. Discussion

## A. Non-Hand-Signing Detection as a Distinct Problem

Non-hand-signing differs from forgery in that the questioned signature is produced by its legitimate signer's own stored image rather than by an impostor. The detection problem is therefore framed around *intra-signer image reproduction* rather than *inter-signer imitation*. This framing has analytical consequences. The within-CPA signature distribution is the analytical population of interest; the cross-CPA inter-class distribution is a *reference* against which intra-CPA similarity is interpreted, not the population to be modelled. This contrasts with most prior offline signature verification work, which treats genuine-versus-forged as the central two-class problem.

## B. Per-Signature Similarity is a Continuous Quality Spectrum; the Accountant-Level Multimodality is Composition-Driven

The Big-4 accountant-level descriptor distribution rejects unimodality on both marginals at $p < 5 \times 10^{-4}$ (§IV-D Table V). The composition decomposition of §III-I.4 shows that this rejection is fully attributable to two non-mechanistic sources: (a) between-firm location-shift effects on both axes — Firm A's mean dHash of $2.73$ versus Firms B/C/D's $6.46$, $7.39$, $7.21$ creates a multi-peaked pooled distribution that any single firm's distribution lacks — and (b) integer mass-point artefacts on the integer-valued dHash axis, which inflate the dip statistic against a continuous-density null. A 2×2 factorial diagnostic applied to the Big-4 pooled dHash (firm-mean centring × uniform integer jitter $[-0.5, +0.5]$, 5 jitter seeds) shows that the dip test fails to reject ($p_{\text{median}} = 0.35$, 0/5 seeds reject) when *both* corrections are applied; either correction alone leaves the rejection in place. Within the Big-4 firms, the descriptor marginals at the signature level are unimodal once integer ties are broken (Scripts 39b, 39d); eligible non-Big-4 firms provide corroborating raw-axis evidence on the cosine dimension (Script 39c) but are not used as calibration evidence (§III-I.4). The descriptor distributions therefore lack a within-population bimodal antimode that could anchor an operational threshold. The K=2 / K=3 mixture fits are retained in §III-J as descriptive partitions of the joint Big-4 distribution that reflect firm-compositional structure, not as inferential evidence for two or three latent mechanism modes.

## C. Firm A as the Templated End of Big-4 (Case Study, Not Calibration Anchor)

Firm A is empirically the firm whose CPAs are most concentrated in the high-cosine, low-dHash corner of the Big-4 descriptor plane. In the Big-4 K=3 hard-posterior assignment (now interpreted as a firm-compositional position assignment; §III-J), Firm A accounts for $0\%$ of C1 (low-cos / high-dHash position) and $82.5\%$ of C3 (high-cos / low-dHash position); the opposite pattern holds at Firm C, which has the highest C1 concentration at $23.5\%$. Firm A also accounts for 145 of the 262 byte-identical signatures in the Big-4 byte-identical anchor of §IV-H (with Firm B 8, Firm C 107, Firm D 2). Byte-level decomposition of the 145 Firm A pixel-identical signatures (see supplementary materials) shows they span 50 distinct Firm A partners (of 180 registered), with 35 byte-identical matches occurring across different fiscal years.

We treat Firm A as a *templated-end case study within the Big-4 sub-corpus* rather than as the calibration anchor for the operational threshold. Firm A enters the Big-4 anchor-based ICCR calibration on equal footing with the other three Big-4 firms (§III-L). The cross-firm hit matrix of §III-L.4 strengthens this framing: under the deployed any-pair rule, within-firm collision concentration is $98.8\%$ at Firm A and $76.7$–$83.7\%$ at Firms B/C/D (the stricter same-pair joint event saturates at $97.0$–$99.96\%$ within-firm across all four firms). Firm A's per-document D2 inter-CPA proxy ICCR of $0.6201$ (versus Firms B/C/D's $0.09$–$0.16$) — the counterfactual rate at which Firm A documents would fire HC$+$MC if same-CPA pools were replaced by random inter-CPA candidates — reflects high inter-CPA collision concentration under the deployed rule, consistent with firm-specific template, stamp, or document-production reuse. (The corresponding observed rate on real same-CPA pools, from Table XVI, is substantially higher: $97.5\%$ HC$+$MC for Firm A; the proxy and observed rates measure different quantities and are not directly comparable.) The inter-CPA-anchor analysis alone is not diagnostic of deliberate template sharing. The byte-level evidence above (Firm A's 145 pixel-identical signatures across $\sim 50$ distinct partners) provides direct evidence of image-level reuse among Firm A signatures; the distribution across many partners is consistent with a firm-level template or production workflow, and the within-firm collision pattern at all four Big-4 firms is consistent with similar, milder within-firm collision patterns at Firms B/C/D, whose mechanisms may include template-like reuse, digitisation-pipeline homogeneity, or signing-style homogeneity (§V-H).

## D. K=2 / K=3 as Descriptive Firm-Compositional Partitions

Leave-one-firm-out cross-validation of the Big-4 mixture fit reveals a sharp contrast between K=2 and K=3 behaviour. K=2 is unstable: across-fold cosine-crossing deviation is $0.028$, and holding Firm A out gives a fold rule (cos $> 0.938$, dHash $\leq 8.79$) that classifies $100\%$ of held-out Firm A in the upper component, while holding any non-Firm-A Big-4 firm out gives a fold rule near (cos $> 0.975$, dHash $\leq 3.76$) that classifies $0\%$ of the held-out firm in the upper component. The K=2 boundary is essentially a Firm-A-vs-others separator — direct evidence that the K=2 partition reflects firm-compositional rather than mechanistic structure.

K=3 in contrast has a *reproducible component shape* at the descriptor-position level: across the four folds the C1 (low-cos / high-dHash) component cosine mean varies by at most $0.005$, the dHash mean by at most $0.96$, and the weight by at most $0.023$. Hard-posterior membership for the held-out firm is composition-sensitive (absolute differences $1.8$–$12.8$ pp across folds). Together with the §III-I.4 composition decomposition (no within-population bimodal antimode), the K=3 stability supports a descriptive reading: the Big-4 descriptor plane has a reproducible three-region partition that reflects how firm-compositional weight is distributed across the descriptor space, *not* a three-mechanism latent-class structure. We accordingly do not use K=3 hard-posterior membership as an operational classifier; we use it as the accountant-level descriptive summary that complements the deployed signature-level five-way classifier of §III-H.1.

## E. Three-Score Convergent Internal-Consistency

Three feature-derived scores agree on the per-CPA descriptor-position ranking at Spearman $\rho \geq 0.879$: the K=3 mixture posterior (a firm-compositional position score, not a mechanism cluster posterior); the reverse-anchor cosine percentile under a non-Big-4 reference distribution; and the deployed box-rule less-replication-dominated rate. The three scores are *not* statistically independent measurements — they are deterministic functions of the same per-CPA descriptor pair — so the convergence is documented as internal consistency rather than external validation against an independent ground truth (which the corpus does not provide for the hand-signed class). The strength of the convergence (all pairwise $|\rho| > 0.87$) and its persistence at the signature level (Cohen $\kappa = 0.87$ between per-CPA-fit and per-signature-fit K=3 binary labels) are nevertheless informative: per-CPA aggregation does not collapse the broad three-region ordering, and three different summarisations of the descriptor space produce broadly concordant per-CPA rankings, with a residual non-Firm-A disagreement (the reverse-anchor cosine percentile ranks Firm D fractionally above Firm C, while the mixture posterior and the deployed box-rule rate rank Firm C highest among non-Firm-A firms).

## F. Anchor-Based Multi-Level Calibration

The operational specificity-proxy behaviour of the deployed HC sub-rule and document-level HC$+$MC alarm derived from the five-way classifier is characterised at three units of analysis (§III-L), all against the same inter-CPA negative-anchor coincidence-rate proxy. The per-comparison ICCR is consistent with the corpus-wide rate reported in §IV-I (cos$>0.95 \to 0.00060$) and extends it to the structural dimension (dHash$\leq 5 \to 0.00129$; joint $\to 0.00014$). The pool-normalised per-signature ICCR captures the deployed rule's effective per-signature rate under inter-CPA candidate-pool replacement ($0.1102$ pooled Big-4 any-pair HC), exposing that the per-comparison rate is not the deployed-rule rate at the per-signature classifier level: the deployed classifier takes max-cosine and min-dHash over a same-CPA pool of size $n_{\text{pool}}$, so the inter-CPA-equivalent rate scales approximately as $1 - (1 - p_{\text{pair}})^{n_{\text{pool}}}$ in the independence limit. The per-document ICCR aggregates to operational alarm-rate units: HC alone $0.18$, the operational HC$+$MC alarm $0.34$.

Two additional findings refine the calibration story. First, the per-pair conditional ICCR for dHash$\leq 5$ given cos$>0.95$ is $0.234$ (Wilson 95% $[0.190, 0.285]$): given the cosine gate, the structural dimension provides further per-comparison specificity at $\sim 4.3\times$ refinement. Second, the alert-rate sensitivity analysis (§III-L.5) shows the deployed HC threshold is locally sensitive rather than plateau-stable (local gradient $\approx 25\times$ the median for cosine, $\approx 3.8\times$ for dHash); alternative operating points can be characterised by inverting the ICCR curves (e.g., a tighter rule cos$>0.95$ AND dHash$\leq 3$ on the same-pair joint corresponds to per-signature ICCR $\approx 0.045$). The MC/HSC sub-band boundary at dHash$=15$, by contrast, *is* plateau-like (local-to-median ratio $\approx 0.08$), consistent with high-dHash-tail saturation.

## G. Pixel-Identity Positive Anchor and Inter-CPA Coincidence-Rate Negative Anchor

The only conservative hard-positive subset in the corpus is pixel-identical signatures: those whose nearest same-CPA match is byte-identical after crop and normalisation. Independent hand-signing cannot produce byte-identical images, so these signatures are a conservative hard-positive subset for image replication. On the Big-4 subset ($n = 262$ pixel-identical signatures), all three candidate checks — the deployed box rule, the K=3 hard label, and the reverse-anchor metric with a prevalence-calibrated cut — achieve $0\%$ positive-anchor miss rate (Wilson 95% upper bound $1.45\%$). We caution that this result is necessary but not sufficient: for the deployed box rule it is close to tautological, because byte-identical neighbours have cosine $\approx 1$ and dHash $\approx 0$, well inside the rule's high-confidence region. The corresponding signature-level *negative* anchor evidence is developed in §III-L.1 above (per-comparison ICCR $= 0.00060$ at cos$>0.95$, consistent with the corpus-wide rate of $0.0005$ reported in §IV-I). We frame the per-comparison rate as a specificity proxy under the assumption that inter-CPA pairs constitute a clean negative anchor, and we document in §III-L.4 that this assumption is partially violated by within-firm cross-CPA template-like collision structures.

## H. Limitations

Several limitations should be transparent. We group them into primary methodological limitations, secondary scope and validation caveats, documented design features, and engineering-level caveats of the pipeline.

**Primary methodological limitations.**

*No signature-level ground truth; no true error rates reportable.* The corpus does not contain labelled hand-signed or replicated classes at the signature level. We therefore cannot report False Rejection Rate, sensitivity, recall, Equal Error Rate, ROC-AUC, precision, or positive predictive value against ground truth. All quantitative rates reported in §III-L are inter-CPA negative-anchor coincidence rates (ICCRs) under the assumption that inter-CPA pairs constitute a clean negative anchor; this is a specificity proxy, not a calibrated specificity (§III-M).

*Inter-CPA negative-anchor assumption is partially violated and the violation is firm-dependent.* The cross-firm hit matrix of §III-L.4 shows that under the deployed any-pair rule, within-firm collision concentration is $98.8\%$ at Firm A and $76.7$–$83.7\%$ at Firms B/C/D (the stricter same-pair joint event saturates at $97.0$–$99.96\%$ within-firm across all four firms), consistent with firm-specific template, stamp, or document-production reuse. The inter-CPA-as-negative assumption is therefore not exactly satisfied — some inter-CPA pairs may share firm-level templates rather than being independent random matches. Our reported per-comparison ICCRs are best read as specificity-proxy rates under a partially-violated assumption, not as calibrated FARs. Because the violation is firm-dependent, Firm A's per-firm ICCR is more contaminated by within-firm sharing than Firms B/C/D's; the per-firm B/C/D rates of $0.09$–$0.16$ may therefore be less contaminated than the pooled rate, and the Firm A vs Firms B/C/D contrast reflects both genuine firm heterogeneity and a firm-dependent proxy-contamination gradient.

*Mechanism attribution for the firm-level heterogeneity is not identifiable from descriptor-only data.* The observed firm-level contrast (Firm A's per-document HC$+$MC ICCR of $0.62$ versus $0.09$–$0.16$ at Firms B/C/D; within-firm collision concentration $77$–$99\%$ under the deployed any-pair rule; byte-identical evidence of §IV-H) is consistent with at least three non-mutually-exclusive firm-level mechanisms: (i) template, stamp, or e-signature production reuse; (ii) digitisation-pipeline homogeneity — shared scanners, common PDF generation infrastructure, identical compression and form-template settings — that systematically inflates image-descriptor similarity without signature replication; and (iii) signing-style or training homogeneity that produces correlated handwritten signatures within a firm. The descriptor pair (cosine, dHash) operates at the image-similarity level and is, by construction, indifferent to which mechanism generated a given near-identical pair. We therefore report the firm contrast as a methodological observation — the framework discriminates at firm-level resolution — rather than as a mechanism finding. The byte-identical Firm A signatures across $\sim 50$ distinct partners (§IV-H, §V-C) provide direct evidence for (i) at Firm A specifically, but do not exclude additive contribution from (ii) or (iii); the milder within-firm collision patterns at Firms B/C/D are individually consistent with all three mechanisms. Image-acquisition metadata (scanner identifiers, PDF generator fingerprints, compression-codec markers), partner-level intent records, or controlled hand-signed baselines would be needed to attribute the contrast across (i), (ii), and (iii).

*Scope.* The primary analyses are scoped to the Big-4 sub-corpus. We did not perform the full per-signature pool-normalised ICCR analysis at the full $n = 686$ scope; the §IV-K full-dataset Spearman re-run shows the K=3 $+$ deployed box-rule rank-convergence is preserved at $n = 686$ but does not establish portability of the Big-4 operational ICCRs, the LOOO firm-fold structure, or the five-way operational classifier at the broader scope.

**Secondary scope and validation caveats.**

*Pixel-identity is a conservative subset.* Byte-identical pairs are the easiest replicated cases, and for the deployed box rule the positive-anchor miss rate against byte-identical pairs is close to tautological (byte-identical $\Rightarrow$ cosine $\approx 1$, dHash $\approx 0$, well inside the high-confidence box). A score that fails the pixel-identity check would be disqualified, but passing the check does not guarantee correct behaviour on the broader replicated population (e.g., re-stamped or noisy-template-variant signatures).

*Rule components not separately re-characterised by the present diagnostic battery.* The five-way classifier's moderate-confidence band (cos $> 0.95$ AND $5 < \text{dHash} \leq 15$), the style-consistency band ($\text{dHash} > 15$), and the document-level worst-case aggregation rule retain their prior calibration and capture-rate evidence (supplementary materials); the anchor-based ICCR calibration covers the binary high-confidence sub-rule (and its tightening alternatives such as dHash$\leq 3$), and the alert-rate sensitivity analysis (§III-L.5) characterises only the HC threshold. The MC and HSC sub-band boundaries are not separately re-characterised by the present diagnostic battery.

*Deployed-rate excess is not a presumed true-positive rate.* The $\sim 44$-pp per-document gap between the observed deployed alert rate (HC: $0.62$ on real same-CPA pools) and the inter-CPA proxy rate (HC: $0.18$) cannot be interpreted as a presumed true-positive rate without additional assumptions that §III-M shows are unsafe (consistent within-CPA signing can exceed inter-CPA similarity at the cosine axis; within-firm template sharing inflates the inter-CPA proxy baseline). The gap is best read as a same-CPA repeatability signal.

*A1 pair-detectability stipulation.* The per-signature detector requires at least one same-CPA pair to be near-identical when a CPA uses image replication. A1 is plausible for high-volume stamping or firm-level electronic signing but not guaranteed when a corpus contains only one observed replicated report for a CPA, multiple template variants used in parallel, or scan-stage noise that pushes a replicated pair outside the detection regime.

**Documented design features.**

*K=3 hard-posterior membership is composition-sensitive.* The K=3 hard-posterior membership for any single firm varies by up to $12.8$ pp across LOOO folds. This is documented as a composition-sensitivity band rather than failure, but it means K=3 hard labels are not used as operational classifier output; they are reported only as accountant-level descriptive characterisation.

*No partner-level mechanism attribution.* The analysis reports population-level patterns; it does not perform partner-level mechanism attribution or report-level claims of intent. The signature-level outputs are signature-level quantities throughout. The within-firm cross-CPA collision concentration of §III-L.4 is consistent with template-like reuse but is not by itself diagnostic of deliberate sharing.

**Engineering-level caveats of the pipeline.**

*Transferred ImageNet features.* The ResNet-50 feature extractor uses pre-trained ImageNet weights without signature-domain fine-tuning. While our backbone-ablation study (§IV-L) and prior literature support the effectiveness of transferred ImageNet features for signature comparison, a signature-domain fine-tuned feature extractor could improve discriminative performance.

*Red-stamp HSV preprocessing artifacts.* The red stamp removal preprocessing uses simple HSV color-space filtering, which may introduce artifacts where handwritten strokes overlap with red seal impressions. Blended pixels are replaced with white, potentially creating small gaps in signature strokes that could reduce dHash similarity. This bias would push classifications toward false negatives rather than false positives.

*Longitudinal scan / PDF / compression confounds.* Scanning equipment, PDF generation software, and compression algorithms may have changed over the 2013–2023 study period, potentially affecting similarity measurements. While cosine similarity and dHash are designed to be robust to such variations, longitudinal confounds cannot be entirely excluded.

*Source-exemplar misattribution in max/min pair logic.* The max-cosine / min-dHash detection logic treats both ends of a near-identical same-CPA pair as non-hand-signed. In the rare case where one of the two documents contains a genuinely hand-signed exemplar that was subsequently reused as a stamping or e-signature template, the pair correctly identifies image reuse but misattributes non-hand-signed status to the source exemplar. This affects at most one source document per template variant per CPA and is not expected to be common.

*Legal and regulatory interpretation.* Whether non-hand-signing of a CPA's own stored signature constitutes a violation of signing requirements is a jurisdiction-specific legal question. Our technical analysis can inform such determinations but cannot resolve them.
